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ARE EMPLOYERS WHO REFUSE TO HIRE
SMOKERS DISCRIMINATING WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990?
Federal legislation requires that all individuals be given an
equal opportunity for employment.1 One of the most recent legisla-
tive attempts to ensure civil rights is the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 (ADA). 2 The ADA is a broad-ranging, comprehen-
sive statute designed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
disability in the areas of employment,3 public services and trans-
portation,4 public accommodations, 5 and telecommunications.' Its
five titles address the serious and pervasive social problem of soci-
' See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1989) (principal fed-
eral statute prohibiting job discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin). The notion that discrimination has no place in the formation or enforcement
of employment contracts can be traced back to the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1989); see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1989) (prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
promoting employment based on ability rather than age); Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. §
206 (1989) (prohibiting gender-based pay discrimination).
2 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Pamph. 1992). The Americans with Disabilities Act
was signed by President Bush on July 26, 1990 and became effective on July 26, 1992. Id.
The use of "Americans" in the title signifies that disabled individuals are a meaningful com-
ponent of our nation, but it should not be interpreted to mean that only American citizens
are protected. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 27 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 449-50.
The use of the term "disabilities" rather than "handicaps" reflects the current termi-
nology and the preference of disabled individuals, and does not alter the substantive defini-
tion of handicap contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra,
pt. 2, at 50-51, pt. 3 at 26-27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 332-33, 449-50; S. REP. No.
116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989). See generally, Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 923 passim (1990) (analyzing individual
titles within the ADA).
3 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12117 (Title I). For a brief overview of Title I of the ADA, see
infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
4 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12165 (Title 11). Title II extends and explains the regulations of
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to all programs, activities, and services provided by
state or local government regardless of whether they receive federal funding. See id.
I 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12181-12189 (Title III). Title III affects providers of public accommo-
dations (hotels, restaurants, theaters) and those responsible for contracting places that have
a potential for employment of the disabled and is concerned with accessibility. See id.
a 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 225, 611 (West Pamph. 1992) (Title IV). Title IV ensures the provision
of telecommunications services to hearing- and speech-impaired individuals. See id.
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ety's neglect of and discrimination against individuals with disabil-
ities.7 The basic premise underlying Title I of the ADA is that per-
sons with disabilities should not be excluded from job
opportunities unless they are unable to perform the duties
entailed."
Recently, some employers have adopted a policy that refuses
to hire smokers.9 Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin,10 smokers are not a protected class
under the Act. Smokers that have been aggrieved by employer off-
duty restrictions on smoking have attempted to protect their rights
by filing constitutional and common law claims, however, these
claims have been uniformly rejected.1 It may now be possible,
however, for smokers to protect their rights under the ADA. 12
This Note will consider the applicability of the ADA's anti-
discrimination protections for employment applicants who are re-
fused employment because of their tobacco use. Part I will present
a brief history and overview of Title I of the ADA and its regula-
7 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a).
a See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
454.
See BNA, WHERE THERE'S SMOKE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES CONCERNING SMOKING IN
THE WORKPLACE 14, 137 (1986) [hereinafter WHERE THERE'S SMOKE]; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF
PROGRESS, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 575-590 (1989) [hereinafter TwENTY-FIvE
YEARS OF PROGRESS]; see also Fred Williams, Burning Issue at Work: Firms' Rules Put
Smokers Under Fire, USA TODAY, May 1, 1990, at 1B (noting that Motorola, Northern Life
Insurance, and Take Packaging Corp. of America banned hiring of smokers).
1o See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1989). "Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to
guarantee a job to every person .... " Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
Rules prohibiting employment discrimination are not applied equally nor do they treat all
types of discrimination equally. See 1 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) % 205.
.. See, e.g., Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1987)
(fire department ban on off-duty smoking did not violate due process clause or liberty, pri-
vacy, or property interest of trainee firefighter); Rossie v. Department of Revenue, 395
N.W.2d 801, 807 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that statute restricting smoking in certain
areas does not violate equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment). But see Best
Lock Corp. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Employment & Training Servs., 572 N.E.2d 520
(Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that employer rule prohibiting off-duty smoking unreasona-
ble). See generally Elizabeth B. Thompson, Note, The Constitutionality of an Off-Duty
Smoking Ban for Public Employees: Should the State Butt Out?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 491,
509-21 (1990) (analyzing public employees' constitutional claims based on off-duty employer
regulations governing employees' off-duty behavior).
12 See WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 9, at 33; Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to
Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 940,
956 (1987).
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tions. Part II will present the prima facie elements required for a
cause of action under the Act, focusing primarily on the threshold
issue whether or not a smoker is "disabled." It will begin with a
brief discussion of nicotine addiction, and continue with statutory
interpretation and case law decisions considering disability under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Additionally, possible employer de-
fenses and policy considerations will be addressed. Finally, Part III
will discuss how smokers' rights may best be protected.
I. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
The Fess-Kenyon Act, passed in 1920,13 was the first major
legislative challenge to the then prevalent notion that a "handi-
cap" meant lifelong economic dependency.14 After decades of
struggle, marked by landmark litigation 15 and legislation,16 the
struggle for employment rights for people with disabilities
culminated in the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.17 The
Rehabilitation Act protects the disabled from employment dis-
crimination by federal agencies and private employers receiving
federal funding.18 The ADA of 1990 is broader in scope than the
13 See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 25, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
448 (citing 41 Stat. 735 (the first Rehabilitation Act)).
14 Id. The inferior economic and social status of the disabled had been viewed as inevi-
table. See id.
"1 See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that
disabled children may not be excluded from public education); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding that
mentally retarded children had right to public education).
16 See, e.g., National Housing Act Amendments, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1989) (mandating
barrier removals from federally supported housing); Education of the Handicapped Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1989) (providing that disabled children are entitled to free education
in least restrictive environment); Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4151 (1989) (man-
dating accessibility to handicapped of federally funded or leased buildings); Urban Mass
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1989) (requiring accessibility of mass transit).
17 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-
796 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992)). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was formulated to eliminate
employment discrimination against the disabled by any federal agency or entity receiving
$2,500 or more from any federally funded contract. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 793. For the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations effectuating § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act, see Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1990); see
also Richard F. Richards, Handicap Discrimination in Employment: The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 39 ARK. L. REV. 1 passim (1985) (overview of case law interpreting sections 501,
503, and 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 867 passim (1984)
(discovering differing interpretations of Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
" Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
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Rehabilitation Act in that it attempts to address and correct pub-
lic perceptions of individuals with disabilities. 19 The purpose of the
ADA is to eliminate discrimination against the forty-three million
disabled Americans and to provide a place for them in American
social and economic life by providing clear, strong, and consistent
standards enforceable by the Federal government.2 0 The Act ex-
tends to disabled Americans the same civil rights guaranteed under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Its substantive framework is based
on regulatory and case law interpretations of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,22 while the procedural framework borrows from the
powers and remedies provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.23
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination 24 by a "covered
entity" 25  against a "qualified individual with a disabil-
19 H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453-
54.
20 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1)-(4).
21 H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt.3, at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 449.
Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate the disabled. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§12101(a)(2)-(3). Discrimination against the disabled continues, particularly in areas of "em-
ployment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, rec-
reation, institutionalization, health services, voting and access to public services." Id.
"[U]nlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
national origin, religion, or age, [the disabled] . . . have often had no legal recourse, id. §
12101(a)(4), and [as a result have been] socially, economically, and educationally disadvan-
taged, id. § 12101, (a)(6). The goals of the Act "are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living and economic self-sufficiency" for the disabled. Id. §
12101(a)(8). Denial of the opportunity to compete on an equal basis costs the United States
billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-productivity.
See id. § 12101(a)(9).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 28-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 450-54.
23 See id.
24 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(7). The term "discriminate" includes limiting, segregating or
classifying a job applicant or employee; participating in contractual relationships that effect
discrimination; using standards, criteria, and tests that screen-out individuals with disabili-
ties (unless the test is job-related and consistent with business necessity); excluding an indi-
vidual because of a known relationship with a disabled individual; and failing to make rea-
sonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities who could thereby perform the
essential functions of the job. See id.
28 Id. § 12111(2). The term "covered entity" means employers, employment agencies,
labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees. See id. The legislative history
shows that the definitions of "person," "labor organization," "employment agency," "com-
merce" and "industry affecting commerce" are adopted from Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
445. "Employer" means "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce" who has 25
or more employees. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A). "'Employee' means an individual em-
ployed by an employer." See id. § 12111(4). Elected officials, their employees and appoin-
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ity ''2e solely on the basis of that individual's disability," in regard
to all terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.28 Title I
specifically enumerates prohibited acts of discrimination,2 includ-
ing the employer's use of medical examinations or inquiries in the
employment screening process.30 Section 103, however, outlines
several defenses to the denial of employment."s Pursuant to section
103, discriminatory criteria may be applied to a disabled individual
when they are job related and consistent with business necessity
and if (1) the employer cannot accomplish reasonable accommoda-
tion for the disability;32 or (2) the individual poses a direct threat
to the health or safety of others in the workplace.3 3 In addition, a
religious entity is permitted to give employment preference to indi-
viduals of a particular religion. 4
tees are not excluded under the ADA. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 32,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 455.
28 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8). "Qualified individual with a disability" means one who pos-
sesses the necessary skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements and
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
job. Id. Consideration is given to an employer's judgment as to what constitutes essential
functions. Id.; see, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406-07
(1979) (holding that otherwise qualified person is one able to meet all requirements despite
disability).
27 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a). "[T]here must be a nexus between the exclusion and the
disability." Regulation to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1992); see also Richardson v. United States Postal
Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (D.D.C. 1985) (distinguishing discharge for improper off-duty
criminal conduct from discharge for alcoholism).
28 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a). This includes "job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training." Id.
20 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a),(b); see supra note 24.
20 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(1)-(4). "[A] covered entity shall not conduct a medical exami-
nation or make inquiries of a job applicant as to . . . disability." Id. § 12112(2)(A). See
generally Leland B. Cross Jr. & Douglas C. Haney, Legal Issues Involved in Private Sector
Medical Testing of Job Applicants and Employees, 20 IND. L. REV. 517, 535 (1987) (con-
cluding legal limits on private sector employers are irrefutably linked to methodology cho-
sen to screen workers).
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a)-(d).
-2 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a). See generally Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Em-
ployment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 passim (1991) (distinguishing ADA's
duty of reasonable accommodation from other forms of employment discrimination under
Title VII).
23 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(b).
24 Id. § 12113(c)(1).
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II. PRIMA FACIE ELEMENTS
A cause of action under Title I of the ADA parallels the re-
quirements for a private cause of action under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.35 Thus, a plaintiff who is denied em-
ployment because the employer refuses to hire smokers will have
the burden of proving four elements in order to set forth a prima
facie case 6 of discrimination: first, the individual must prove that
he is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA;37 second, that he
is "otherwise qualified" for the position;"s third, that the employer
discriminated against him solely on the basis of the disability; 9
and finally, that the employer is a "covered entity" under Title J.40
A. Is a Smoker "Disabled"?
More than twenty-five years have elapsed since the health
hazards of smoking were first brought into public focus. 41 The first
official report issued by the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee
on Smoking and Health in 1964 referred to tobacco use as "habitu-
ating. '42 Fifteen years later, after considerable research, smoking
35 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 2.
31 See Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 181-82 (3d Cir.) (step-by-step analy-
sis of prima facie elements), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); Strathie v. Department of
Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (prima facie elements for case under § 504 of
Rehabilitation Act); see also infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (prima facie elements
applied by analogy to ADA).
37 See Sullivan, 811 F.2d at 181. As the ADA incorporates the substantive requirements
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, it is reasonable to assume that under the ADA a
plaintiff will face the same prima facie burden. See id.; see also supra notes 22, 35-36 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative reliance on elements and structure of Rehabilita-
tion Act).
38 See Sullivan, 811 F.2d at 182; supra note 26; see also infra note 80 and accompany-
ing text (discussing "otherwise qualified individual").
3' See Sullivan, 811 F.2d at 182; supra note 27; see also infra note 82 and accompany-
ing text (referring to necessary nexus between disability and the exclusion at issue).
40 See Sullivan, 811 F.2d at 182; supra note 25; see also infra note 83 and accompany-
ing text (discussing application of statute to employer).
,1 See generally TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF PROGRESS at 7-10 (noting retrospective view of
smoking and health findings over past twenty-five years); Rothstein, supra note 12, at 941-
46 (discussing hazards, demographics and costs of smoking).
42 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 351 (1964)
[hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Report distinguished "addicting" and "ha-
bituating" drugs and asserted that tobacco use was habituating. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., AND WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 10-11 (1988) [hereinafter NICOTINE ADDICTION]. By late 1964, how-
ever, the World Health Organization dropped the distinction and the term "dependence"
1114
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was called the prototypical substance-abuse dependency.4" In 1989,
scientists in the field of drug addiction concluded not only that
cigarettes are addicting, but also that nicotine is the drug causing
the addiction and that the psychological and pharmacologic addic-
tions accompanying cigarette smoking are similar to cocaine and
heroin addictions. 44 The American Psychiatric Association sup-
ported the Surgeon General's findings and included nicotine addic-
tion in its diagnostic guide as a "substance use disorder.
45
The ADA sets forth three alternative criterion in defining dis-
ability: first, a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity; second, a record of such an impair-
ment;46 or third, being regarded as having such an impairment.4 7
was recommended instead. Id. at 10-11; see also Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine
Addiction, 1988, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and Environment of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (statement of Jack E.
Henningfield, Ph.D, of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services) (describing nicotine as an addictive euphoriant and psychoactive
drug).
43 See TwENTY-FvE YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 330-331 (citing to U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH EDUC., AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
16-25 (1979)).
" See NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 42, at 6-7. The central findings and conclusions
of this report were drawn from concepts of drug dependence developed by the World Health
Organization (WHO), the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and the American Psy-
chiatric Association. Id. The primary criteria for a finding of drug dependence are: "highly
controlled or compulsive use, psychoactive effects, and drug reinforced behavior." Id. Addi-
tional criteria include "stereotypic patterns of use, use despite harmful effects, relapse fol-
lowing abstinence, and recurrent drug cravings." Id. at 7-8. Dependence producing drugs
often produce "tolerance, physical dependence, and pleasant (euphoriant) effects." Id.
"Persons seeking treatment for drug dependence ... rate[d] urges for cigarettes ... as
high as or higher than their main problem substances." See Lynn T. Kozlowski et al., Com-
paring Tobacco Cigarette Dependence With Other Drug Dependencies; Greater or Equal
"Difficulty Quitting" and "Urges to Use," but Less "Pleasure" From Cigarettes, 261 JAMA
898, 898-901 (1989). "Nicotine dependence ... causes more death and disability than all
other drug disorders combined ... ." John R. Hughes, Comorbidity of Mental Disorders
and Nicotine Dependence, 265 JAMA 1256, 1256-57 (1991).
45 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-HI-R), at 169-70 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-IlI-R].
"I For purposes of this Note, however, the second portion of the definition "[a] record
of such an impairment," is inapplicable, and thus, will not be discussed.
4 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). Congress adopted this definition from the Rehabilitation Act
and intended that relevant case law thereunder would similarly apply to the term "disabil-
ity" under the ADA. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 50, pt. 3, at 27, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 449-50; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 21; see also School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279, 282-86 (1987) (teacher susceptible to tuberculo-
sis "regarded as" physically impaired); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir.
1981) (extensive history of hospitalization for "mental impairments" sufficient to claim dis-
abled status); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097-1102 (D. Haw. 1980)
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An individual satisfying any one of these criteria will be considered
"disabled" within the meaning of the ADA.48 Congress, therefore,
attempted to protect a large number of people in a broad range of
possible situations.4" Indeed, the ambitious nature of such defini-
tion demands a case-by-case analysis.50
1. Physical or Mental Impairment
To understand the meaning of the term disabled one must
first discern what constitutes a "physical or mental impairment." 51
The statute includes within the meaning of physical or mental im-
pairment "any mental or psychological disorder. '52 Both the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association and the Surgeon General have vali-
(case of first impression interpreting "impairment" and "substantial limitation of major life
activity" under Rehabilitation Act). But see Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d
1244, 1248-51 (6th Cir. 1985) (criticizing Black analysis). The House reasoned that this defi-
nition worked well since 1973 and to provide a list of specific disabilities would restrict the
comprehensiveness of the statute. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 27, re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 450. The EEOC's proposed regulations contained a discus-
sion that included a list of "Frequently Disabling Impairments." Proposed Rules for Equal
Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991). How-
ever, in response to concerns by various commentators, the list was deleted prior to the
adoption of the final regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
The EEOC continues to use the previously cited Black analysis. See e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, app. § 1630.2(j). See generally Andrew W. Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A
Penetrating Interpretation of "Handicapped Individual" for Sections 503 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and for Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Stat-
utes, 16 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 527 passim (1983) (study of Black's opinion interpreting the
definition of "handicapped individual"); Maureen O'Connor, Defining "Handicap" for Pur-
poses of Employment Discrimination, 30 ARiz. L. REv. 633 passim (1988) (analysis of defi-
nition of "handicap").
"8 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(g).
" See Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1098.
" See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 405. "This case-by-case approach is essential if quali-
fied individuals of varying abilities are to receive equal opportunities to compete for an
infinitely diverse range of jobs." Id.
" See id. § 1630.2(h). In particular, "Physical or mental impairment means:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculo-
skeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascu-
lar, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endo-
crine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."
Id. (emphasis added). The list was taken from the regulations for Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 45 C.F.R. §
84.3(j)(2)(1) (1990).
2 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. at 405; see also supra note 51.
1116 [Vol. 66:1109
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dated nicotine addiction as a psychological substance use
disorder. 83
In deciding whether or not nicotine addiction is a physical or
mental impairment under the ADA, courts should first look to the
language of the statute.5 4 While the statute lists a number of ex-
press exceptions to the definition of disability, including transves-
tism, compulsive gambling, and kleptomania, neither smoking
nor nicotine addiction are specifically enumerated among them. 56
Moreover, the statute explicitly excludes from protection any
"psychoactive substance use disorder resulting from current illegal
use of drugs. '57 This exception supports the argument that Con-
gress intended to categorize legal psychoactive substance use disor-
ders (such as nicotine addiction) as "disabilities" and exclude only
illegal drug use.
In addition, hypersensitivity to smoke was held to be a disabil-
ity under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.58 Further, it is proposed
53 See DSM-lII-R, supra note 45, at 165-66; NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 42, at 248-
49.
54 See, e.g., Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1985)
(threshold requirement that individual is a "handicapped person as defined by the stat-
ute"); see also Haines, supra note 47, at 541, 551-54 (analyzing administrative and judicial
interpretations of term "impairment").
"Although the definition does not include a list of all specific conditions, diseases, or
infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments examples include... drug
addiction and alcoholism." H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 28, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 450-51; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (list of frequently disabling impairments
deleted from final regulations to ensure that ADA application will not be limited).
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 12211(b). "'[D]isability' shall not include: (1) transvestism, transsexu-
alism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; (2) compulsive gambling, klepto-
mania, or pyromania; or (3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current
illegal use of drugs." Id. Eyes or hair color, left-handedness, predisposition to illness or dis-
ease, pregnancy, personality traits that are not symptoms of a mental or psychological disor-
der (like "poor judgment" or "quick temper"), poverty, lack of education, prison record, or
advanced age do not constitute impairments. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h).
11 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12208, 12211(b)(1).
:7 Id. § 12211(b)(3).
58 See Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (W.D. Wash. 1982). The
Vickers court held that an employee's hypersensitivity to smoke limits that employee's "ca-
pacity to work in an environment which is not completely smoke free" and thus constitutes
a disability within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id. Yet, the court acknowl-
edged the defendant's stated "duty 'to strive to maintain an equitable balance between
rights of smokers and nonsmokers.'" Id. at 89. The court further stated that until Congress
eliminates smoking from the workplace, smokers' rights "cannot be disregarded." Id. But
see GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 256 S.E.2d 477, 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
legislature did not intend to include within meaning of "handicapped persons" those with
any pulmonary problem, however minor, or all people who are harmed or irritated by to-
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that nicotine addicts should at least be entitled to the limited pro-
tections afforded reformed alcoholics and illegal drug users.50 Al-
though an employer may have legitimate reasons for not extending
job offers or benefits to reformed alcoholics and illegal drug users,
Congress has been wary of the danger of improper discrimination
if such individuals are categorically excluded from protection. It
seems that such discriminatory abuses will occur with respect to
nicotine addicts unless they are afforded similar protection.
In continuing the analysis, this Note will assume, based upon
prior arguments, that nicotine addiction is considered 'an impair-
ment under the ADA. The next, and more critical step in the anal-
ysis is to determine whether this impairment "substantially limits
a major life activity."60
2. Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity
"Major life activity" has been interpreted to mean those func-
tions that an average person can perform easily, such as walking,
seeing, hearing, performing manual tasks, and working."1 "Sub-
bacco smoke).
59 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, subpt. A-4
(1990) (Department of Health & Human Services regulations permit inclusion of drug ad-
dicts and alcoholics under "handicapped person"); see, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 n.14 (1987) (permissible exclusion limited to current drug users or
alcoholics); Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (rehabilitated drug
or alcohol abuser is protected), aff'd, 936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991); Burka v. New York City
Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (protections limited to "rehabilitated
or rehabilitating drug users"). See generally Majerie S. Bertman, Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973: Protection Against Employment Discrimination for Alcoholics and
Drug Addicts, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 507, 516-18 (1979) (clarifying congressional intent and
policy behind inclusion of alcoholics and drug addicts within the meaning of "handi-
capped"); cf. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 945 (national health care costs of smoking average
seventy-two cents per pack of cigarettes; national economic costs of lost productivity aver-
age $1.45 per pack of cigarettes).
;0 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A). By analogy, this language of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 requires that the impairment be a significant one. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931,
932-33 (4th Cir. 1986). It would debase the purpose and protections of the statute if disabil-
ity could be claimed by anyone, however minor the impairment or disadvantage, with re-
spect to gaining employment. Id. at 933; see E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088,
1099-102 (D. Haw. 1980); see also Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1248-
49 (6th Cir. 1985) (physical handicap must meet threshold requirements set forth in Black).
See generally James M. Zappa, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Improv-
ing Judicial Determinations of Whether an Individual is "Substantially Limited," 75
MINN. L. REv. 1303, 1324-36 (1991) (analyzing Black and proposing standard for "substan-
tially limited in a major life activity").
01 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). "Major life activities means functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
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stantially limits" means the inability or significantly restricted
ability to perform one or more major life activity.6 2 Three factors
are considered when determining whether an individual is substan-
tially limited in a major life activity: (1) the nature and severity of
the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the im-
pairment; and (3) the long-term impact, or expected impact of the
impairment.6 3 It should be noted, however, that in determining
whether or not a person is substantially limited, the activity of
working is considered only if an individual is not restricted in any
other major life activity." Additional factors may be considered in
determining whether there is a substantial limitation on an indi-
vidual's ability to work,65 including any geographical limitations
created by the disability and the class of jobs or broad range of
jobs from which the individual would be disqualified as compared
to an average person with otherwise comparable qualifications.66
An individual is not, however, substantially limited due to the
mere inability to perform a particular job for a particular em-
ployer.6 7 Accordingly, in a case-by-case analysis as to whether an
impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working,
any one of these factors could potentially be dispositive. For exam-
ple, it is conceivable that an individual who smokes three packs of
cigarettes a day and resides in a community where the only ex-
isting industry has initiated a hiring policy of refusing to employ
and working." Id. "This list is not exhaustive" and may include, but is not limited to "sit-
ting, standing, lifting, [or] reaching." Id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i); see also Arline, 480 U.S.
at 280-281 (hospitalization for tuberculosis sufficient to establish that major life activity was
substantially limited by impairment).
62 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). Specifically, "substantially limits means: (i) Unable to per-
form a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) [S]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an indi-
vidual can perform a major life activity... as compared... to the average person." Id.
"' See id. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii); see also id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (noting that im-
pairment is "substantially limiting" if it significantly restricts duration, manner or condition
under which individual can perform major life activity as compared with average
individual).
" See id. § 1630.2(j)(3), pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j); see also Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d
931, 933-34 (4th Cir. 1986) (analyzing whether employee's acrophobia restricted ability to
work).
05 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii). The factors are relevant to, but are not required
elements of, a showing of a substantial limitation in working. Id.
11 See id. § 1630.2(])(3)(ii)(A)-(C).
67 See id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934; Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593,
596-97 (N.D. Tex. 1985); see also Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (concluding that person exceeding maximum weight for flight attendants not lim-
ited in major life activity but rather merely prevented performance of single job).
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smokers, the first part of the ADA's definition of disability may be
conclusive, thereby affording the individual the protections of the
ADA. An individual who fails to satisfy this first part of the defini-
tion may, however, be able to satisfy a second definition, which is
discussed below.
3. Regarded as Having Such Impairment
Although an individual may have a condition that does not
substantially limit a major life activity, the reaction of others to
the condition may prove just as disabling."' Hence, the ADA also
protects an individual who is "regarded as" having an impair-
ment.69 One is "regarded as" having an impairment when, although
the impairment does not in fact substantially limit a major life ac-
tivity, the individual is treated as having such a limitation.70 This
may result from the attitudes of others towards a condition, 71 or
from the mere rumors that the individual has a condition that does
not actually exist at all.7 2 A plaintiff who can show that an em-
ployer has made an employment decision based on a myth, fear, or
stereotype regarding the plaintiff's condition will have satisfied the
"regarded as" definition of disability.73 This definition demands a
68 See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1986). "Congress ac-
knowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." Id. (citation
omitted).
39 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(c). In fact, the Act protects those with "(A) A physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) A record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment." Id.
70 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1). For example, an employer may transfer an employee
with controlled high blood pressure, an impairment which is not "substantially limiting," to
a less strenuous job for fear that the individual may have a heart attack. See id. pt. 1630,
app. § 1630.2(1).
" See id. § 1630.2(l)(2). For example, an employer may refuse to hire an individual
with a prominent facial scar or a tic out of fear of negative reactions by coworkers or cus-
tomers despite the fact that the scar or twitch does not affect job performance. See id. pt.
1630, app. § 1630.2(1).
Common attitudinal barriers that impact on employers' exclusions of individuals per-
ceived as disabled include concern for "productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attendance,
cost of accommodation and accessibility,. . . and acceptance by coworkers and customers."
See id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 30,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453. This list indicates Congressional intent to include
attitudinal obstacles within the meaning of "regarded as" having a disability. Id.
11 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3). For example, an employer might discharge an individual
because of a rumor that the employee is HIV infected. See id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1).
7 See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284; H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 30, reprinted
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lesser burden of proof from the plaintiff 4 because an individual
"regarded as" having an impairment is not required to show that
the employer's perception is inaccurate.7 5 Instead, an inference in
favor of the plaintiff arises, which will prevail unless the employer
can provide a non-discriminatory explanation for its action. 76 Con-
sequently, given the social revolution relating to smoking1 7 and its
negative health consequences,7 the third, "regarded as" definition
for disability may provide the strongest support for an action
brought by a smoker under the ADA.
B. Remaining Prima Facie Elements
In cases deciding if other substance abusers were disabled,
whether the applicant was "otherwise qualified" 79 for the position,
was the critical element.8 0 "An otherwise qualified person is one
who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his
handicap."8' It is unlikely, however, that smoking, alone, will
render an individual unqualified. 2
Additionally, the discriminatory behavior must be based solely
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453.
7' See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(1); see also H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt.
3, at 30-31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453.
7 See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
453.
76 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1); see also S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 31.
7 See TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 11. Smoking among adults
has decreased from forty percent in 1965 to twenty-nine percent in 1987. Id. Social accepta-
bility of smoking is declining. Id. at 244. The public majority favors restricting smoking in
worksites. Id. at 245.
78 See id. at 12. Smoking remains the most preventable cause of death in America. Id.
at 11. Keep in mind, however, that over three-quarters of a million smoke related deaths
were avoided because individuals were able to quit smoking. Id. Each year, more than
400,000 Americans die as a result of cigarette-related disease. U.S. DmE'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SMoIUNG TOBACCO & HEALTH: A FACT BOOK 1 (rev. 10/89) [hereinafter SMOK-
ING TOBACCO & HEALTH].
79 See supra note 26.
80 See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (semi-
nal case interpreting "otherwise qualified" as used in the Rehabilitation Act); Crewe v.
United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1987) (job appli-
cants with history of alcoholism must also be otherwise qualified); Wallace v. Veterans Ad-
min., 683 F. Supp. 758, 761-62 (D.Kan. 1988) (rehabilitated registered nurse was disabled
and otherwise qualified under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
81 Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1978).
82 See DSM-mI-R, supra note 45, at 182. "Since nicotine.., rarely causes any clinically
significant state of intoxication, there is no impairment in... occupational functioning as an
immediate and direct consequence of its use." Id.
1993] SMOKERS 1121
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1109
on the disability.8 An employment policy under which an em-
ployer refuses to hire smokers would undoubtedly satisfy this ele-
ment. The final element, requiring that the employer be a "covered
entity" is broadly inclusive, encompassing any employer with fif-
teen or more employees.8 4
C. Possible Defenses
The ADA prohibits employers from treating individuals with
disabilities differently 5 from others solely on the basis of the em-
ployers' attitude toward the disabilities. 6 Employers may use se-
lection criteria that negatively affect individuals with disabilities
only when the criteria are clearly job-related and consistent with
business necessity.8 7 Furthermore, even if such limiting criteria are
job-related and consistent with business necessity, employers may
nevertheless be required to make reasonable accommodation. In
order to avoid compliance, an employer may submit evidence that
accommodation would cause undue hardship, 9 but a case-by-case
83 See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983); Doe v.
New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
8' See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(A). "'Employer' means a person ... who has 15 or more
employees for... 20 or more calendar weeks ... ." Id. For the initial two years of the ADA,
however, the number of employees is set at 25. Id.
88 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(a); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
299-309 (1985) (analyzing disparate impact claim under Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of
1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-34 (1971) (seminal case analyzing dispa-
rate impact of facially neutral employment policy under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of
1964); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1981) (determin-
ing applicable standards for disparate impact claim).
8 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(a).
8 See id. Employer concerns about potential increases in insurance costs or worker
compensation claims is not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for disparate treatment.
Id.; see also Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (employer has
burden of establishing that qualification essential to job), aff'd, 936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991).
88 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(b)-(c). Reasonable accommodation includes mak-
ing facilities accessible, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment, buying or modifying equipment, training materials or policies, providing qualified
readers or interpreters. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o); see
also Nisperos, 720 F. Supp. at 1432 (burden on employer to prove reasonable accommoda-
tion not possible). See generally Lisa L.Lavelle, Note, The Duty to Accommodate: Will
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities
Only to Disable Small Businesses, 66 NoTRE DAmE L. REV. 1135 passim (1991) (exploring
scope of employers' duty to accommodate disabled and what constitutes undue hardship).
88 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(10)(A). "'[U]ndue hardship' means an action requiring sig-
nificant difficulty or expense ... " Id. Factors to determine undue hardship include: nature
and cost of accommodation; overall financial resources of the facility, business, or operation;
number of employees; effect on resources; impact on operation. See id. § 12111(10)(B); see
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analysis is required to determine if additional business costs of em-
ploying the disabled individual are significant.90 Finally, compli-
ance with another federal statute could serve as a defense, but it
"may be rebutted by a showing of pretext, or by showing that the
federal standard [does] not require the discriminatory action."9'
Thus, while the defenses mentioned above are not exhaustive,92 it
is doubtful that statutory defenses would protect an employer
from a cause of action brought by a smoker, who has otherwise
established a prima facie case of discrimination.
D. Policy Considerations
Policy considerations will undoubtedly weigh heavily in decid-
ing whether or not to include nicotine addiction as a protected dis-
ability within the meaning of the ADA. The policy motivation be-
hind the ADA is to improve the quality of life, economically and
socially, for the forty-three million disabled Americans." The addi-
tion of more than fifty million smokers 4 to the classification of
"disabled" would substantially limit the effectiveness of the ADA.
Moreover, as reflected in the Surgeon General's Report, the gov-
ernment has set a goal to eliminate tobacco use by the year 2000.95
Protecting smokers from employment discrimination would con-
also Nisperos, 720 F. Supp. at 1432 (holding that employer bears burden of proving undue
hardship). See generally Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship
Turns Undue?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1311 passim (1991) (discussing shortcomings in defini-
tions of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" under ADA).
1* See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(d). Other employees' fears or prejudices or the
negative impact on morale of other employees toward a disabled individual would not
represent undue hardship. Id. But see Williams, supra note 8, at 18. ("Smoking costs com-
panies about $65 billion a year in absenteeism and higher health-care bills, according to the
Office of Technology Assessment.")
1 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(e).
See id. § 1630.15.
o See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 47, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
329. The ADA is an attempt to promote greater dignity and improved quality of life for
people with disabilities. Id. "[D]iscrimination makes people with disabilities dependent on
social welfare programs rather than allowing them to be taxpayers and consumers." Id. at
44. "Discrimination deprives our nation of a critically needed source of labor in a period
where demographic and other changes in our society are creating shortages of qualified ap-
plicants ..... Id. Discrimination also negates the billions of dollars invested to educate the
disabled. Id. at 46.
G See TwENTY-FrvE YEARS OF PROGRESS, supra note 9, at 661. While more than fifty
million Americans continue to smoke, ninety million would be smoking today but for the
recognition of health hazards and smoking. Id.
91 See id. at 10.
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flict with this public health policy. Similarly, there are enormous
financial costs associated with smoking which could be avoided, in-
cluding the direct medical costs of smoking-related diseases96 and
indirect costs to businesses and health insurance providers and
carriers.9 7 Nevertheless, these health and economic concerns must
be weighed against the reluctance to allow employers to monitor
employees' legal off-duty activities and lifestyles.9
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In what appears to be a direct response to employment poli-
cies of refusing to hire smokers, a number of states have recently
enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination against tobacco users.9
Most of these statutes protect the job rights of employees who
smoke or use tobacco products off-duty;100 some extend protection
to other undefined off-duty activities. 101 In light of the uncertain
coverage for smokers under the ADA, legislation of this kind may
best protect smokers' rights.
CONCLUSION
As the number of smokers continues to decrease, it remains to
96 See SMOKING TOBACCO & HEALTH, supra note 78, at 9. Cigarette smoking accounts for
$22 billion in medical costs each year. Id.
11 See id. Cigarette smoking costs business $43 billion in lost production. Id.
" See Thomas J. Barnes & Gregory M. Palmer, Private Matters in Private Employ-
ment, 3 DEr. C.L. REV. 825 passim (1986) (discussing private employer's right to collect, use
and disclose employee information).
" See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-5-4-1 to -4 (Burns 1992) (effective 7/1/91); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23:966 (West Supp. 1992) (effective 9/17/91); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597
(West Supp. 1992) (effective 10/9/91); 1991 Miss. Laws ch. 610, § 17 (effective 7/1/91); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.333 (Michie 1992) (effective 10/1/91); 1991 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
275:37-a (1992) (effective 1/1/92); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 to -4 (West Supp. 1991) (effec-
tive 7/15/91); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-11-1 to -6 (Michie Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§
500-503 (West Supp. 1992) (effective 5/28/91); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-20.7.1-1 (Michie Supp.
1992) (effective 7/12/90); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 41-1-85 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (effective 6/
25/90); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(d) (Michie Supp. 1991).
100 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (West Supp. 1992). It is unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate against any person with respect to the person's compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment for using tobacco products outside the course
of employment as long as the employee complies with any workplace policy concerning the
use of tobacco." Id.
'01 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.333 (Michie 1992). "It is an unlawful employ-
ment practice ... [to] discriminate against any employee because he engages in the lawful
use ... of any product, outside of the premises of the employer during his nonworking hours
.... Id.
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be seen whether smokers will receive the benefits and protections
of the ADA. As this Note has explained, although an addicted
smoker may be considered "disabled" and able to establish the re-
maining prima facie elements under the ADA, the definitive out-
come is uncertain. Undoubtedly, conflicting policy considerations,
namely health hazards and economic costs versus infringement of
employee off-duty lifestyles, will be weighed and ultimately influ-
ence a court's analysis. Consequently, state legislation banning em-
ployment discrimination against smokers may be the best solution
to this controversial issue.
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